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This article makes four points. First, it suggests regulation of entry into the finance 
profession, whose tasks would include ‘prescribing’ a portfolio choice for (financially) 
uninformed investors. Second, it suggests that the government should encourage 
information collection to help ensure informational efficiency of markets. Third, it 
introduces a new ‘academic’ concept - optimal noise in financial markets. Fourth, in the 
context of financial intermediaries, given that deposit insurance, lender of last resort, 
capital adequacy, and supervision of banks are in place, there is no need to impose the 
following beyond reasonable prudential norms: (a) cash reserve ratio requirement, (b) 
statutory liquidity ratio requirement, and (c) barriers to entry. 
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The recent financial crisis and recession have drawn attention to various lacunae in 
regulations in an economy. Here we will confine ourselves to regulations in one part of 
the economy only viz., the financial sector. It is primarily the banking (including the 
shadow-banking) sector within the broader financial system, which has been in news for 
lack of adequate regulations. But there are also serious inadequacies in regulation of the 
other part of the financial system viz., financial markets. While the need for greater 
regulation in the banking sector is well recognized now, the same cannot be said in case 
of the financial markets. Moreover, while the financial crisis has highlighted the need for 
greater regulation, and rightly so, we also need to remember that for very long there have 
been parts of the financial system in some economies that have been excessively 
controlled or regulated. This is usually termed as financial repression (Goldsmith, 1969). 
Correction of the regulatory regime requires removal or reduction of this financial 
repression.   
 
Though there are lessons to be learnt from the recent experience in the world economy in 
general and in the US economy in particular, there is also a long experience from the pre-
crisis days in emerging economies like India. While the recent experience in US points to 
lacunae in regulations, the past experience in India points to financial repression. Any 
major policy overhaul in India needs to check both the lacunae in financial regulatory 
framework as well as financial repression.  
 
The lacunae in regulations in the financial sector have been noted primarily in the context 
of one part of the financial system viz., the part that deals with financial intermediaries. 
This article will show that there are serious lacunae in regulations in the context of the 
other part of the financial system as well viz., the financial markets.  
 
This is not an article on the current financial crisis per se, though it may have been 
motivated by it and the writings on these events. On one hand, it cautions against extreme 
reactions to the current events. On the other hand, it also suggests where there has been 
an almost complete neglect of some important issues.   
 
The discussion of regulations in the banking sector here is within the paradigm in which 
both the lender of last resort (LLR) facility and deposit insurance are present. Moreover, 
we take it for granted that banks are supervised. We abstract from this issue here. This is 
not to suggest that it is not important in the context of the current crisis. Finally, capital 
adequacy norms too are in place though there is scope for improvement. These can be 
revised upwards – for banks in general and for the non-bank financial intermediaries 
(NBFIs) in particular. There is, of course, a larger issue as to why these are required. 
Discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this article. We will here assume that 
all these are in place. In this context, do we need other prudential controls and regulations 
in banking? In particular, do we need the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and the statutory 
liquidity ratio (SLR) requirements? Do we need to impose barriers to entry in the banking 
sector? Do we need to impose restrictions in various ways on banks in their quick and 
easy recovery of loans? If the answer to these questions is yes, then is it a conditional yes 
or an unconditional yes?    
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In practice, there is considerable participation by irrational traders or noise traders in 
financial markets. This is fairly wide-spread and persistent. It has, as we will elaborate 
later, far reaching adverse implications not only for the financial markets but also for the 
financial system as a whole. Indeed there are implications for the economy as a whole. So 
there is a need to do something about this problem. One rather radical solution is that we 
impose a restriction that investors must consult a financial analyst who ‘prescribes’ a 
portfolio choice (just as qualified medical practitioners alone can prescribe medicines to 
patients). And we need stringent criteria to certify that some people can indeed function 
as financial analysts, financial advisors and finance executives. The idea is to reduce, if 
not eliminate, irrational behaviour in the financial system. It is true that noise traders also 
play a positive role, as we will see. However, what may be required is noise. One way to 
get this is by having participation of noise traders who are irrational. But there are other 
ways. As Dow and Gorton (2006) write, ‘Irrationality is not needed to explain significant 
amounts of noise’ (p. 5). We will explain this in detail later.   
 
There is evidence of mispricing of financial assets, which is widespread, considerable and 
persistent (though there is still debate about many methodological and conceptual issues). 
Just imposing a license requirement alone is not going to be easy or adequate. Indeed 
there can be teething troubles and imperfections in the new regulatory regime. We will 
see how there can be vested interests in the present system that can work against a change 
in the regulatory regime. Many other changes too may be required. We will discuss how 
there is a need to reconsider the teaching of and research in financial economics. In 
particular, what is the role of behavioural finance vis-à-vis, what we may call, non-
behavioural finance? Why are animal spirits important in finance? Why are fancy or 
complex products a big concern in financial economics (and not in other fields)? We will 
consider a comparison between financial economics and physical/medical sciences in this 
context. It is true that at present investors do have access to a ‘professional’ route to 
investments in financial markets. This takes the form of mutual funds. However, as we 
will see, these have their limitations.  
 
This article is divided into four sections. Section I discusses the difference between 
optimal regulation and actual regulation of a financial system. We will discuss how 
lacunae in regulations and financial repression can co-exist. Discussion in this section 
may seem elementary but it is very important, and worth discussing. A financial system 
may be broadly divided into two parts - financial intermediation and financial markets. 
Section I deals with the financial system in general rather than with financial 
intermediation alone or with financial markets alone. Section II discusses regulation of 
financial intermediation in India. Section III discusses regulations of financial markets. 
This discussion is not specific to any one country. It is more general though we will 
consider some examples from India and from the US. We conclude in section IV.  
 
 
I Optimal regulation and actual regulation 
 
It is well known in the literature that markets alone cannot ensure efficiency in an 
economy. There is a need for regulations in an economy in general and in the financial   4 
sector in particular. This, however, does not imply that each and every part of the 
financial system needs to be regulated, or equally regulated, or regulated in one and the 
same way. Ideally, governments would regulate only what needs to be regulated, and 
leave other parts of the financial system unregulated. In practice, often governments over-
regulate some parts of the financial system and under-regulate other parts.   
 
We may classify the financial sector in two ways. In the first classification, we can divide 
a financial system into two parts on the basis of actual regulation – one part that is 
actually regulated and another part that is not actually regulated. In the second 
classification, we can divide a financial system into two parts on the basis of need for 
regulation – one part that needs to be regulated and another part that does not need to be 
regulated. With this two-fold classification, we get four categories into which a financial 
system can be divided:  
 
(a) Part of the financial system that is actually regulated and is in need of regulation, 
(b) Part of the financial system that is actually regulated but is not in need of 
regulation, 
(c) Part of the financial system that is not actually regulated but is in need of 
regulation, and 
(d) Part of the financial system that is not actually regulated and is in no need of 
regulation.  
 
The above is admittedly a very simplified picture. We have considered a financial system 
in which either there is a need for regulation or there is no need for regulation. This is a 
black and white picture. Either we have black colour or we have white colour. There is no 
grey colour in the picture. However, as we will see, this picture is good enough for 
making some analytical points. Ideally, a financial system would consist of two parts 
only viz., part (a) and part (d). These two categories cover cases in which regulation is 
actually carried out if and only if it is needed. In an ideal world, part (b) and part (c) 
would be empty sets. However, in practice, typically this is not the case. Part (b) and part 
(c) are not empty sets in practice. It is hard for policy makers to ensure that these two sets 
are completely empty. There can be practical difficulties in ensuring an ideal regulatory 
framework. Part (b) and part (c) can, in practice, have some positive size. This, however, 
does not imply that part (b) and part (c) need have substantial size due to practical 
difficulties in ensuring an optimal regulatory framework. If they do, then this is a 
reflection of an inappropriately conceived regulatory framework.  
 
As Table 1 suggests, the regulatory framework can be inappropriate in two ways. First, a 
financial system can have part (b). Second, a financial system can have part (c). Part (b) 
is a case of, what we know in the literature as, financial repression – there are controls 
and regulations that are not needed for prudential purposes, and that repress the financial 
system. We may view part (c) as a case of, what we may call, lacunae in financial 
regulatory framework. In this case, there is a vacuum in the sense that regulations are 
needed but they are not in place.  
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We can have either a large part (b) or a large part (c) in a financial system (alongside part 
(a) and part (d)). It is also possible that both part (b) and part (c) are large and co-exist in 
a given country. In the context of many countries, there are other possibilities. For 
simplicity, consider two countries – country A and country B. Country A may be 
characterized by lacunae in financial regulatory framework whereas country B may be 
characterized by financial repression. Both countries need to improve their respective 
regulatory frameworks. However, they need to do this in different ways. While country A 
obviously needs to regulate more than it has done in the past, observe that country B 
needs to regulate less than it has done in the past. Moreover, country A needs to regulate 
more only those parts of its financial system that are in need of regulation but have been 
actually left unregulated. Country A does not need to increase regulation in all parts of its 
financial system. Similarly, country B needs to decrease regulation only in those parts of 
the financial system that have been over-regulated. Country B does not need to decrease 
regulation in general.    
 
 
Table 1: A two-fold classification of a financial system 
  Regulation needed   Regulation not needed 
Regulation actually  
carried out  
Part (a)   Part (b) – a case of  
financial repression 
Regulation not actually  
carried out   
Part (c) - a case of  





In the context of the current financial crisis, it is the lacunae in financial regulatory 
framework that have been in the news, and rightly so. This is particularly the case in the 
US where there is a need to increase regulation in some parts of the financial system e.g. 
in case of investment banking. There is a need to tighten capital adequacy norms for 
investment banking in the US. What about India? While there are parts of the financial 
system in India that are in need of more regulation (e.g. the non-bank financial 
intermediaries (NBFIs)), India is still more a case of financial repression than a case of 
lacunae in financial regulatory framework (if we must give only one of the two labels to 
the financial system). Commercial banks are still over-regulated in India (more on this 
later). So there is a need to selectively deregulate commercial banking in India. So there 
is no contradiction in saying that while US needs to regulate more, India overall needs to 
regulate less.  
 
The distinction between the two cases of financial repression and lacunae in financial 
regulatory framework is important. When this distinction is not made, there can be wrong 
analysis and conclusions. An example of this is the policy lesson that some politicians 
and journalists have drawn in India in the recent past. It has been loudly proclaimed that 
the Indian financial system is more resilient and did not witness a banking crisis because 
it has not been liberalized very much. This conclusion is not quite correct. As we will see, 
every case of liberalization is not a case of an increase in vulnerability, and every case of 
regulation is not a case of ensuring prudent behavior.    6 
 
In the next section, we will see how there is considerable financial repression in the 
banking sector in India, what effects this repression has on the economy, and how this 
repression can be removed or reduced without making the banking sector vulnerable to a 
banking crisis. Thereafter in section III, we will see how the financial markets face an 




II Regulation of financial intermediation 
 
In India, we have financial repression in the banking sector in the sense that we have a 
high CRR requirement, a high SLR requirement, barriers to opening new banks and even 
new branches, restrictions on payment of interest on some deposits (like current 
accounts), restrictions on banks in quick recovery of their loans, and so on. On the other 
hand, we also have lacunae in financial regulatory regime in India in the sense that the 
present capital adequacy norms are low - particularly in case of NBFIs. So India is a case 
of both financial repression and lacunae in the financial regulatory framework as applied 
to financial intermediaries. But, as these examples show, India is perhaps more a case of 
financial repression and less a case of vacuum in financial regulatory framework.  
 
Many of the cases of financial repression are confined to India and perhaps some other 
developing countries. Developed countries by and large do not use these. In the recent 
academic literature too, there is hardly any discussion of such issues. See for example 
Gorton and Winton (2003). While India can differ from developed countries in its 
regulations of financial intermediaries, we have to have strong reasons for making such a 
case. As the analysis below shows, it is hard to make such a case.    
 
CRR requirement 
The CRR requirement in India has been high compared to what have become accepted 
norms in many parts of the world. Though it has now been brought down substantially, it 
is still high at about 5%. Typically the interest rate on reserves is much less than that on 
loans. So the income of the banks is adversely affected. This can reduce the interest rate 
on deposits and/or increase the interest rate on loans. The result is that the size of the 
banking sector shrinks. This can adversely affect the economy anywhere but more so in a 
country like India where banking is supposed to be more important than financial markets. 
So there is a need to reduce the CRR requirement.  
 
It may be argued that a reduction in CRR can make a bank vulnerable because banks 
would then have low cash reserves with which to meet liquidity needs of its customers. 
This can be problematic for the bank customers. Also a failure to meet such needs may 
trigger a run on a bank with all its ramifications. These fears were indeed valid in the past 
when the LLR was not present and deposit insurance did not exist. Given the LLR facility 
at present, banks do not need to keep large cash reserves, and given the deposit insurance, 
banks need not fear a run.  
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In any case, observe that CRR is a mandatory requirement. This means that cash reserves 
kept to meet the CRR requirement cannot in any case be used to meet the liquidity needs 
of bank customers!  
 
Given that the LLR facility is present, there is no need for an additional prudential 
measure such as a large CRR requirement. There is, of course, the issue of moral hazard. 
The availability of LLR facility can encourage banks to ignore liquidity risk. This 
problem can, however, be taken care of easily. The LLR can charge a penalty in its 
interest rate imposed on funds borrowed by banks (Bagehot, 1873). It may be argued that 
it may not be very practical or wise to charge a high interest rate from banks that borrow 
funds from the LLR, which will typically happen when an individual bank or many banks 
are going through a crisis. A high interest rate imposed on funds borrowed can further 
compound the problems of banks in difficulty.  
 
Observe that the apprehensions due to a low CRR are valid in the context of banks that 
have inadequate capital. Losses incurred by these banks can wipe out their capital and 
they may need to close down. On the other hand, if banks have adequate capital, then a 
penalty only affects the profitability of the bank. It does not make a bank vulnerable in 
the sense that survival is not at stake. So the original sin is that banks are allowed to 
function with little capital which is when the issue of high interest costs for banks is 
bothersome. Note that we have already identified inadequate capital as a case of lacuna in 
financial regulations. This vacuum needs to be filled. Thereafter, we can easily reduce the 
CRR requirement, if not eliminate it altogether.  
 
Of course, a high CRR serves another purpose for the central bank. The latter pays 
interest on reserves of banks which is much lower than the returns on investments made 
by the central bank. So the CRR requirement is a source of income for the central bank 
and, hence, for the government (since the latter owns the former). As such, the CRR 
requirement may be viewed as a tax on banking. Like any tax, this too discourages the 
activity that is being taxed (and encourages some other activity in a larger general 
equilibrium context). So the CRR requirement reduces banking activity. See Fama (1980).  
 
It is true that any tax has a distortionary effect. The issue then is whether or not banking 
is more desirable compared to other activities in the economy. If it is, then (implicit) 
taxation of banking is not a good idea. For a long time, the government in India has (and 
indeed governments elsewhere too have) repeatedly given indications that it views 
banking as special. This view has been further reinforced in the recent past with emphasis 
on financial inclusion. An important part of financial inclusion is making banking 
accessible for ordinary households. In this context, a tax on banking in the form of a CRR 
requirement is not desirable. The implication is straightforward. It is time to drastically 
reduce CRR, and if possible, eliminate it altogether. This can be done gradually. Needless 
to say, this does not imply that banks will choose to keep zero reserves (that is costly for 
them). 
 
Reserve requirements have been declining worldwide. ‘In the United States, the FED 
eliminated reserve requirements on time deposits in December 1990 … Canada has gone   8 
a step further: Financial market legislation taking effect in June 1992 eliminated all 
reserve requirements over a two-year period. The central banks of Switzerland, New 
Zealand, and Australia have also eliminated reserve requirements entirely.’ (p. 406, 
Mishkin, 2004).    
 
SLR requirement 
Banks in India are required to invest a fraction (about 25%) of their assets in government 
securities. The SLR requirement is supposed to increase liquidity with banks. However, 
like CRR, this is a mandatory requirement. So the government securities cannot really be 
used to raise cash to meet liquidity needs of banks! If they were used, there would be a 
violation of the SLR requirement. Moreover, it is only recently that we are seeing a 
somewhat developed market for government securities so that we can indeed say that 
government securities in India are liquid. Otherwise it was a case of asking banks to keep 
securities, which were effectively illiquid, under the head of statutory liquidity ratio! So it 
is doubtful if the SLR requirement helped to meet liquidity needs of banks. 
 
We have a high SLR requirement imposed on banks in India. In contrast, we do not see 
such a requirement imposed on banks in developed countries like the US. Despite the 
financial crisis in the US, there has been no talk of imposing an SLR requirement on 
banks there. This suggests that the SLR requirement is dispensable as far as prudential 
management is concerned.   
 
It is true that the SLR requirement serves another purpose in India i.e. it helps the 
government finance its deficits in a non-inflationary way, and without increasing the 
government’s external debt. With the SLR requirement, the government is getting 
committed funds from commercial banks to finance its deficits. Since this does not in any 
big way increase the base money on account of financing fiscal deficits, it does not lead 
to an excessive increase in money supply and correspondingly an excessive increase in 
the inflation rate (given a simple Quantity Theory of Money framework, for simplicity). 
The SLR requirement affects primarily the allocation of credit. It decreases credit to the 
private sector and for commercial purposes, and increases the same for the government. 
Also the SLR requirement enables the government to internally finance its deficits i.e. 
within the country. So it need not borrow abroad. So external debt of the government 
(which is often viewed as being more problematic than the government’s domestic debt) 
is avoided or at least kept in check. So the SLR instrument is useful for the government. 
Would a reduction of SLR not then create difficulties for the government and for the 
Indian economy at large?  
 
An alternative to SLR requirement 
Let us begin from the beginning. The government’s tax revenues are small compared to 
the expenditures, and so there are deficits which need to be financed in various ways. 
One way is direct borrowing from the market. This seems a costly way. Moreover, there 
is uncertainty about how far the market is willing to provide funds to a government that 
cannot be said to be very credible financially – an unfortunate but hard reality in case of 
India. Another way is that the government imposes the SLR requirement, and thereby 
ensures for itself a definite access to funds. This raises an important question – to begin   9 
with, why are the government’s revenues small relative to its expenditure? It is true that 
there is quite a bit of wasteful expenditure and there is a need to cut this sooner rather 
than later. In the long run context, however, there is a more basic problem. Even if the 
wasteful expenditure is cut drastically, there are various expenditures that the government 
does need to increase over time (expenditure on social security, public health, education, 
and so on). So there is no escape from increase in taxation in the long run, even if 
wasteful expenditures are cut.  
 
Observe that the tax GDP ratio in India is very small compared to that in most developed 
countries. It is true that there is greater scope for tax evasion in a less developed economy, 
given that corporations in the formal sector play a smaller role in a developing economy 
than in a developed economy, and given that the tax authorities can better monitor and 
verify the accounts and actual flows of funds at the level of a corporation than at the level 
of small and numerous enterprises in the informal sector. So it is possible that the tax 
GDP ratio in a less developed country would be naturally less than that in a developed 
country. However, at present, the difference between the tax GDP ratio between the two 
kinds of countries is very large – too large to be explained by differences in their 
development. In developed countries like the US and many European countries, tax GDP 
ratio roughly varies from 30% to 40%. On the other hand, in developing countries, the 
ratio could vary from 10% (or even less) to 20% or so. What then can explain the large 
difference in tax-GDP ratio between developed countries and developing countries? Tax 
collection is a function of how effective the administrative tax machinery is, rather than 
on just how developed an economy is. The diagnosis then is simple. The government 
needs to improve its tax administrative machinery so that the tax revenues can be 
increased relative to the GDP.  
 
Let us consider an analogy. Observe that typically, institutes of higher education are 
better developed in more developed countries than in developing countries. One may 
have thought that this is natural. However, in India there are some highly reputed 
institutes of higher education even though India is a developing country. The reason is 
simple. Despite being under-developed, we decided to set up and maintain some high 
quality institutes. So there is nothing natural about developing countries being under-
developed in higher education just because they are under-developed as far as some other 
parameters are concerned. Let us now return to the issue of taxation. If the government 
spends more on, and looks better after, the tax administrative machinery, then it is 
possible to substantially increase the tax GDP ratio – perhaps not to as high a level as it is 
in developed countries but definitely make a dent in the status quo.  
 
Let us return to the issue of financial repression in the form of SLR requirement imposed 
on banks. Recall that we argued that effectively the rationale for SLR requirement is that 
the government needs to finance its deficits. We have now argued that one simple way to 
reduce deficits is that the government raises its tax revenues, and one important way in 
which this can be done is that the government improves its tax administrative machinery. 
So while, on one hand, the government needs to remove the SLR requirement, on the 
other hand, it also needs to improve its tax administrative machinery. The government 
should be doing this in any case. After all, taxation is an important role of the government.   10 
On the other hand, it is the SLR requirement which is not natural. The SLR requirement 
tries to make funds available indirectly through the banks to the government in a non-
transparent manner. It is amazing how, for so long, we have continued to live with an 
unnatural arrangement.  
 
In the long run, there is no alternative to raising taxes. Otherwise the government will 
need to compromise on social welfare. It is true that the government can for very long 
continue to finance its deficits by imposing the SLR requirement on banks. However, 
there is no free lunch. The SLR requirement adversely affects lending for productive 
purposes. At the margin, it affects the rate of growth of economy. So it is important to get 
rid of the SLR requirement as soon as possible.  
 
Barriers to entry 
There are serious barriers to entry into the banking sector in India. The central bank in 
India rarely gives a new license. It is true that in the 1990s, after the general liberalization 
in the economy, there were some new private sector banks that were set up. However, 
after that phase, there has been a major slowdown in giving new bank licenses. It is true 
that the banking sector is different from other sectors in the economy but this does not 
imply that the government imposes serious barriers to entry into banking. Banking is 
different and the way to take care of its special place is that we have the LLR facility for 
banks, capital adequacy norms are imposed in case of banking, deposit insurance is in 
place, and banks are supervised by the government. Of course, it is also important that the 
government takes care in who it is giving a license to. So it can have some (strict) 
eligibility criteria. But, in practice, the government goes too far. It hardly gives out any 
new licenses even if the applicants are sound.  
 
There may be an apprehension that the license may go to some group that is not sound. 
Even if the government occasionally makes an error in granting a license to a group that 
is actually not sound, there are safeguards thereafter to check malpractices. There is the 
minimum capital requirement. Besides, banks are regularly supervised. It may be argued 
that the government has limited manpower to carry out supervision which is why it 
cannot have too many banks to look after. But clearly the regulatory regime has to keep 
pace with a growing economy, instead of the growth rate of the economy adjusting to the 
size and quality of the regulatory regime.  
 
It is important to remove or at least reduce barriers to entry for the simple reason that we 
still do not have adequate banking in the country (see Government of India, 2008, Report 
of the Committee on Financial Sector Reforms, popularly known as Raghuram Rajan 
Report). In the absence of new and potential competitors, the existing banks do not have 
adequate incentives to improve. There is remarkable similarity between different banks in 
their ways of functioning and quality of service. This is, of course, partially due to 
uniform regulations imposed on all banks. But it is also because there is little innovation 
in the banking sector due to lack of effective competition. On the other hand, there has 
been remarkable improvement in financial markets as far as new products are concerned. 
Derivatives have evolved. Mutual funds come up with new and innovative products   11 
(more on this later). Banks need to improve further, and reducing barriers to entry can 
help achieve this.  
 
Restrictions on easy and quick recovery of loans 
Recovery of loans has been a difficult process in India for very long. In the early 1990s, 
some attempts were made to address this issue by setting up debt recovery tribunals in 
India. Thereafter, the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Security Interest Act  (SARFAESI Act) was passed by the Parliament in 
2002. However, even now debt recovery is difficult though there has been an 
improvement as compared to the situation in the past.  
 
The textbook reason for banks accumulating non-performing loans (NPLs) is that the 
borrowing firms are unable to repay their loans. In India, we have witnessed other 
reasons. Borrowers do not repay their loans even if they can! They do so if the contract 
enforcement is weak, which it is in India. Ex-ante, nowadays banks tend to be cautious 
and lend to people whom they can ‘trust’. There are difficulties with this. Decision 
making gets more subjective than it needs to be in a world of (near) perfect contract 
enforcement. The borrowing facility is confined to a smaller circle of known people. In 
practice, this means that people who are established and who have contacts have greater 
access to bank loans than new and emerging entrepreneurs. This restricts competition in 
the economy. It is true that in the absence of strong contract enforcement, alternative 
solutions can emerge to ensure recovery of loans. However, these are usually second best 
methods that cannot fully make up for legal enforcement of contracts. 
 
 
This completes our discussion of important forms of financial repression in banks. 
Reducing financial repression can lead to higher output. But this is not the only effect. It 
can even increase overall stability. How? Repression in banking decreases effective 
returns for depositors and increases effective costs for borrowers. This leads many people 
to shift from banks to financial markets. To the extent that there is more instability in 
financial markets than in the banking sector, repression in banks is not simply a case of 
allocative inefficiency, it is also a case of a greater part of the financial system that is 
subject to volatility. So we need to reduce repression in banking for two reasons – 
increase allocative efficiency and decrease the size of the financial sector that is subject 
to volatility.  
 
In this section, we have seen how there is a need to remove various regulations and 
restrictions in the banking sector that are repressive (though there is a need to tighten 
capital adequacy norms for many financial intermediaries). In the next section, we will 
discuss regulation of financial markets.  
 
 
III Regulation of financial markets 
 
Though most of the analysis in this section applies to financial markets in general, we 
will, for simplicity, consider stock markets only.    12 
 
Efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance 
For a long time, the accepted paradigm for understanding price formation in stock 
markets was the one provided by efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Though there have 
always been reservations on this paradigm amongst practitioners, the mainstream 
academic literature in financial economics has, by and large, worked around EMH. 
However, in the last twenty years or so, a somewhat new branch of financial economics 
has evolved. This is behavioural finance. It challenged a key assumption of EMH viz., the 
assumption of rationality.  
 
This new branch of finance shows how the assumption of rationality in the context of 
financial markets can be quite misleading. There is substantial and persistent participation 
in financial markets by the so-called noise traders whose behaviour is far from rational. It 
is true that their participation can throw up arbitrage opportunities for the more informed 
and rational participants. However, the new literature shows how it can be very difficult, 
if not impossible, to exploit such seemingly obvious arbitrage opportunities. The reason, 
in brief, is that the presence of noise traders creates a new risk in the market. This is 
usually referred to as noise trader risk.  
 
If securities are under-priced due to considerable sales by noise traders who have become 
excessively pessimistic, there seems to be an arbitrage opportunity for rational traders. 
The latter can, it seems, buy at such times, make profits, and, in the process, also remove 
the under-pricing. The difficulty is that in future the noise traders may get even more 
pessimistic, sell even more, and drive the prices further down. Ex-ante, the possibility of 
this scenario creates a risk, which is now known as noise trader risk, and which limits the 
exposure of rational traders to the markets in the first place. So arbitrage opportunities 
cannot be fully exploited. The rational traders may be constrained by a short horizon over 
which they need to show results. They may have limited access to funds from uninformed 
investors who may judge them by their recent performance. The result of all this is that 
mispricing in financial markets can be substantial and can persist. See Shleifer (2000).   
 
Under-investment in information, noise, noise traders, and government intervention 
We have so far highlighted the negative role of noise traders. In the literature, there is a 
positive side too to the presence of noise traders. Suppose that there are no noise traders 
in the financial markets. In such a case, there is no incentive for collection of information 
by rational speculators and investors. To see this, suppose that the latter discover after 
their costly research that an asset is under-priced, which they buy. However, this can lead 
the seller to infer that the asset was under-priced. This immediately makes the seller 
reluctant to sell. The result is that price rises, there is no trade, and the speculator is 
unable to reap the benefits of his or her research. Ex-ante, there is little incentive for 
information collection. But it is investment in such information collection that makes the 
stock markets efficient. So the absence of noise traders makes informational efficiency 
impossible. On the other hand, when noise is present, buyers can use their information to 
buy without attracting attention. There is little or no inference by others about 
information. This enables the informed speculators to reap the benefit of their research. In 
this way, noise in stock markets can be useful.       13 
 
The basic argument is that in the absence of noise, some traders can choose not to invest 
in information, and instead obtain information indirectly by making inferences from 
change in prices. In a sense, one group of traders (free rides) is effectively imitating 
another group of traders (who are spending on research). This, of course, in turn 
discourages others from making investment in information in the first place. So in 
equilibrium, there is under-investment in information in the absence of noise traders, and 
accordingly markets are not efficient. This argument raises several interesting issues.  
 
It seems that we have a trade-off. The more the noise, the greater are the incentives for 
information collection by rational speculators. This is the positive impact. On the other 
hand, the more the noise, the more volatile are the prices. This is the negative impact. So 
it seems that we need ‘optimal’ noise – an amount of noise that balances the positive and 
the negative side. But it may be difficult to get the optimal noise once noise traders are 
allowed. We may get too much noise and hence too much volatility. If noise traders are 
absent, then is there an alternative way in which we can get optimal noise in the stock 
market?  
 
Dow and Gorton consider a model in which there is an agency problem. Managers try to 
look for better investment opportunities. However, they may not always find them. In 
such a situation, it may be best that they do nothing. However, there is uncertainty for the 
investors. They cannot distinguish between “actively doing nothing” and “simply doing 
nothing”. These authors argue that ‘that churning by funds, which occurs when they do 
not become informed and want to pretend that they have, is “noise,” in a setting where all 
market participants are rational. … Irrationality is not needed to explain significant 
amounts of noise.’ (p. 4-5, Dow and Gorton, 2006)  
 
We have two concerns with this argument. First, presumably, the significant amount of 
noise is less than that created by noise traders and is closer to being the optimal amount. 
But there is no assurance for this. Dow and Gorton are simply looking for an alternative 
source of noise. They are not concerned with optimal noise. Indeed, as far as this author 
is aware, the notion of optimal noise has not been used so far in the literature. Second, 
investors are themselves unable to distinguish between “actively doing nothing” and 
“simply doing nothing”. However, they are rational. Given that they are rational, what 
prevents them from consulting an independent finance professional who can make such a 
distinction? So either they are not rational or consultants are not available for a 
reasonable fee. So the solution suggested by Dow and Gorton does not seem to be very 
satisfactory. Where do we go from here?    
 
Let us begin with first principles. The problem is under-investment in information. Noise 
traders are a source of noise, which is a solution to the problem of under-investment in 
information. Dow and Gorton suggested another source of noise, as an alternative to 
irrational noise traders. But they are still looking at noise as a solution to the problem of 
under-investment in information. Can we solve the problem of under-investment in 
information in the absence of any kind of noise? Note that under-investment relative to 
optimal investment in any area requires government intervention – for example, in the   14 
form of a subsidy. This argument applies to financial markets too. The government can 
subsidize information collection in financial markets so that there is no underinvestment. 
So a subsidy by the government can be an alternative to using noise as a means to 
ensuring that we do not have under-investment in information.   
 
As mentioned already, it is not clear if investors in Dow and Gorton are rational. We may 
debate this. But one of their basic points is well taken. In the absence of noise traders, 
financial markets do not become perfect or noiseless. There will always be some noise. If 
that noise is adequate, then there is no further problem. If it is inadequate, then 
government intervention can be useful. We do not need irrational noise traders to make 
the financial markets efficient. Our argument for government intervention is not a 
substitute for that of Dow and Gorton. It only supplements their insight. The purpose is to 
ensure that financial markets are efficient. But why is all this important in the first place?  
 
The financial sector and the real sector 
Mispricing in the financial sector can lead to wrong investments in the real sector of the 
economy. Over-pricing of stocks can lead to capacity build up for producing goods that 
are not wanted in the first place – at least not on the scale on which the capacity is built. 
The result at some stage is lack of demand, inventories build-up, cut in production and in 
employment, defaults on debt, an eventual crash in stock price, demand by industry for 
bail-out by the government, and so on. All this is socially costly. Under-pricing also can 
lead to distortions in the real sector. So there is a need for correct pricing in the financial 
sector in the first place so that entrepreneurs and investors are not led to wrong 
investment decisions in the real sector.  
 
Mispricing of assets in financial markets can also create difficulties for financial 
intermediaries. Till recently, we could talk about a classification of banks into 
commercial banks and investment banks. This distinction seems to be on its way out 
(though we may still need to retain the classification between investment banking and 
commercial banking). Important investment banks have closed down or got merged with 
commercial banks in the US. Volatility in financial markets led to havoc in balance 
sheets of investment banks and even those of most commercial banks. In a country like 
the US, the financial system is usually identified more with financial markets than with 
financial intermediaries. However, difficulties in financial intermediation can be 
problematic for the real sector even in a country like the US. Bernanke (1983) showed 
how this was true in the context of the Great Depression. It seems to be true even at 
present after the experience of the financial crisis. Any major disturbance in financial 
markets disturbs considerably financial intermediaries. This in turn can adversely affect 
the real sector. What is the solution?   
 
Regulation of entry into finance profession 
A solution to the problem of persistent mispricing and excessive volatility in stock 
markets is to have a license requirement to operate in these markets. This is similar to the 
actual requirement of a license in other walks of life in countries that are, otherwise, 
liberal. For example, there is a license requirement on driving an automobile, even 
though there is no restriction on purchase of an automobile. This is because safety of   15 
other people is involved. Consider another example from the medical field. Having funds 
or access to funds is a necessary condition for purchase of medicines but this is not 
sufficient. The purchase must be done after a prescription is obtained from a licensed 
medical practitioner. Along the same lines, we could have a requirement that purchase of 
assets is possible only after a consultation with a certified financial analyst who makes an 
assessment of the customer (just as a medical practitioner diagnoses a patient). The 
analyst can then ‘prescribe’ a portfolio choice.  
 
It is true that even at present we do have financial analysts in some countries like the US. 
However, consultation with such an analyst is not really mandatory at present for 
transactions in the financial sector. There may be reservations about the quality of such 
analysts at present. However, we can impose more stringent criteria for granting licenses 
to prospective financial analysts. We will return to this point later. 
 
Before buying financial assets, we need to ask and answer some questions. What are the 
long term prospects of a particular industry? How will new technologies affect a given 
industry? What we can say about demand for products of a particular industry in view of 
changing tastes over time? Understanding of these issues requires two qualities. First, it 
helps to know and use quantitative techniques for analysis and inference. Second, it helps 
to have abilities that are quite general. Insight, vision and broad-based knowledge are 
very general qualities that can be extremely useful in investment decisions. However, 
these qualities are not common at all. Only very few are ‘qualified’ in this respect. The 
bottom line is that financial decisions are not easy. Accordingly, it is best left to experts. 
So we need barriers to entry so that the field is not open to everybody. Some noise traders 
perhaps just like to trade (Black, 1986). Others would not know that they are nose traders. 
If they did, they would not be participating! So barriers need to be imposed.  
 
We have just argued how analysis of fundamentals, which are related to stocks, is 
difficult. It is true that, at present, analysis of fundamentals alone is not sufficient to 
operate or invest successfully in the financial markets. It may not even be necessary for 
many. There is a need for other qualities like judging how others view financial assets. 
This is the analog of Keynes’s well known beauty contest (Keynes, 1936). Participants 
are ranked after they have been judged by a committee of ‘experts’. There are two kinds 
of beauty contests. One is where the judges get a compensation that is not related to their 
judgement of participants. The other kind of contest is where the compensation of judges 
is related to their assessment of participants. The closer a judge is in his or her assessment 
to the overall assessment by the committee as a whole, the higher is his or her 
compensation. Now there is an incentive to be close to the general opinion of judges.  
 
In the first kind of contest, a judge needs to be an expert only in making an assessment of 
the beauty of a participant. In the second kind of contest, a judge needs to be an expert in 
two things. First, he or she needs to be an expert on assessment of the beauty of a 
participant. Second, he or she needs to have a sense of what other judges are thinking. 
The stock market resembles more the second kind of beauty contest than the first kind. 
How well an operator does depends on what he or she thinks of stocks, and what he or 
she thinks of others’ opinions of stocks. So fundamentals alone do not matter at present.   16 
But fundamentals alone do not matter, given the prevailing system or ‘rules of the game’. 
At present, noise traders are present, and it becomes important for others to understand 
what these noise traders are thinking. After a possible removal of such noise traders, there 
is greater scope for focusing on fundamentals.   
 
The suggestion made here to impose a license requirement is, in a sense, radical. It has 
not been done before. Moreover, the decision can affect a large number of people. 
Furthermore, it can change considerably the entire structure and functioning of the 
financial system. However, let us recall that financial crises are very costly, and they 
recur, every now and then, in some form or another, in some part of the world or another. 
Financial crises are closely related to mispricing of assets, and the latter is closely related 
to participation by noise traders. So the license requirement to discourage participation by 
noise traders can help in tackling a serious problem. It is true that reduction of noise 
trader risk does not imply that financial crisis will get eliminated. However, given the 
gravity of the situation in many a financial crisis, we need to improve a financial system 
in whatever different ways we can. One important way is reduction of noise trader risk, 
and one way to do this is to impose a licensing requirement on participation in financial 
markets.      
 
Vested interests against a license requirement  
This suggestion for a licensing requirement for participation in financial markets can face 
strong resistance because there is a large section in the economy that has a vested interest 
in the present system. The stock brokers and dealers, and the financial media have an 
interest in the present system with a high turnover. One reason we have a high turnover is 
that there is considerable churning by noise traders. This churning by noise traders, in 
turn, leads to changing prices and changing expectations of future prices, on a somewhat 
regular basis. The result is that even the more informed and rational participants trade 
more than they otherwise would have. There are commissions for brokerage houses and 
there is advertising revenue for the media. There is also interesting news about stock 
prices rising and falling. This attracts viewers and readers. This, in turn, attracts 
advertisers.  
 
It is interesting that now there is a large literature on behavioural finance that analyses a 
financial system in which irrational traders participate on a large scale. Many such 
academics will possibly find it difficult to apply their analysis to a more rational system! 
So there can be vested interests that would like the present system to continue. It is 
interesting that not everybody is conscious that his or her vested interests are playing a 
role in their defence of the prevailing system. This adds to the difficulty of bringing about 
a change.        
 
Imperfect licensing vis-à-vis no licensing 
There is also the question of selection of deserving candidates for giving licenses for 
participation in the financial markets. Again this is a difficult task. But we could learn 
from experience in selection in other fields. Many countries have somewhat successfully 
evolved criteria for selection of bureaucrats in the government and executives in the 
corporate sector. Similarly, we can make an attempt at appropriate selection of   17 
participants in financial markets. This is not an easy task. This only means that it will 
take some time before we can settle to a good selection mechanism. It does not mean that 
there is no case for making a beginning in having a license requirement for participation 
in financial markets.   
 
Financial economics and physical/life sciences – A comparison 
Mispricing in financial markets is often attributed to animal spirits. In the context of 
economics in general and financial economics in particular, we hear of animal spirits (at 
least since Keynes’s General Theory), and the negative role that these can play. This 
raises an important question - why is it that animal spirits are absent in the context of 
other subjects such as engineering or medicine? Except in rare cases and in cases of new 
designs being tried, we do not hear that there is ‘overshooting’ or ‘volatility’ on a 
somewhat regular basis in engineering or in medicine. In the context of medical science, 
when a surgeon operates on a patient, we do not hear of animal spirits of the doctors or 
the hospital administrators having aggravated the problem, rather than having solved it 
(though in some less developed countries, this does happen because effectively quacks, 
rather than competent doctors, are in charge). The point is that animal spirits matter in 
finance because the field is open to just about anybody including unqualified people, 
whereas in physical sciences and in medicine, the field is by and large restricted to 
qualified people only – at least in developed countries. When only qualified people 
participate, there is hardly any scope for animal spirits in these other fields. However, 
when unqualified people participate in financial markets, there is considerable scope for 
animal spirits.   
 
We do not hear of ‘engineering crisis’ or ‘medical crisis’ the way we do regularly hear of 
‘financial crisis’. There can be various reasons for this. One reason is that the government 
has allowed just about anybody to operate in financial markets without licenses. This 
mistake has been avoided in other fields such as engineering and medicine.   
 
This is not to say that there is no difference between physical sciences and economics (or 
more specifically, financial economics). At the same time there is some scope for 
learning from physical sciences. Also the claim is not that with a licensing requirement, 
the financial markets will completely avoid mispricing and excessive volatility. We must 
remember that participants in the financial sector face a very difficult task. Pricing of 
financial assets and investment decisions requires a rare quality. Participants need vision 
and foresight, apart from intelligence and analytical skills. So the task is not an ordinary 
task and errors are likely. However, there is scope for reducing these.  
 
Fancy or complex products  
There have been complaints about growing complexity in financial markets and how this 
increased complexity has contributed to making the financial crisis more serious than it 
would otherwise have been. Observe that increasing complexity is not a feature of 
financial products alone. With improvements in science and technology, there is 
increasing complexity just about everywhere. And yet, there are hardly any complaints 
elsewhere. The reason is simple. In engineering or medicine, complexity is taken care of 
by qualified people who are the only participants. Similarly in finance, the solution is to   18 
restrict the field to qualified and competent people only. The solution is not to ban 
increased complexity.  
 
Limitations of mutual funds 
It may be argued that mutual fund industry has developed over time, and that investment 
in financial markets through this ‘professional’ route is already available for investors. 
The implication can be that there is no need for financial analysts outside of these mutual 
funds to help investors. This argument is not quite correct. First, there is a substantial 
fraction of funds that does continue to get invested directly in financial markets. Second, 
the mutual funds offer a variety of schemes. This can be good, provided an investor can 
rationally choose amongst these. An uninformed investor is at a loss in selection of 
schemes. Often the selection is effectively arbitrary. This is particularly the case when it 
comes to a selection from within the category of sectoral funds. People with hardly any 
knowledge (leave aside expertise) of a particular sector in an economy take bullish or 
bearish positions on a particular sector. So the variety is, in practice, not very useful. We 
are not arguing against variety offered by mutual funds. We are only saying that investors 
need to consult a financial analyst in order to choose meaningfully from amongst the vast 
variety of funds available.  
 
Third, it is well known that it is difficult to time investment (and withdrawal) decisions in 
financial markets. Often mutual fund investors get caught into buying when the market is 
at high levels, and into selling when the market is at low levels. So the presence of 
mutual funds does not help investors in this respect. The decision to enter and withdraw 
is left to the investor. In many cases, the mutual funds themselves tend to introduce and 
actively market new schemes in times of a boom. So far from helping investors avoid 
getting swept with the waves, the mutual funds may be possibly making it worse than if 
investors had taken timing decisions on their own. There is a tendency to over-invest in 
equity in boom times and under-invest in equity in bad times. This can be avoided to 
some extent, if there are mandatory consultations outside the mutual funds.  
 
Fourth, recall the distinction made by Dow and Gorton (2006) between two types of fund 
managers – those who are “actively doing nothing” and those who are “simply doing 
nothing”. An ordinary investor cannot distinguish between these two cases.  
 
The point is that mutual funds have their limitations. The above criticism should not be 
misunderstood. We are not saying that mutual funds are not useful. We are only saying 
that there is a role for an independent financial analyst. There are decisions other than on 
choice of an equity portfolio or a debt portfolio. To begin with, a financial analyst can 
advise an investor on how much to save or dissave at any stage of life, how to divide this 
between real and financial assets, how to choose within the category of financial assets 
between bank deposits and instruments in financial markets, how to allocate between 
debt and equity given the amount to be invested in financial markets, how to choose 
between different equity schemes given the amount to be invested in equity schemes, and 
so on. Last but not the least, a professional finance practitioner outside a mutual fund can 
help an investor distinguish between managers inside mutual funds who are “actively 
doing nothing” and “simply doing nothing”.    19 
 
It is true that many investors invest in mutual funds through some distributors who can 
provide some advice. However, these distributors typically get commissions from mutual 
funds to market their products. So there is a conflict of interest. What is required is an 
analyst or advisor who is independent. Again to consider an analogy, in medical field, a 
patient consults a doctor who only prescribes medicines, which are then purchased from a 
separate chemist. This is done to avoid a conflict of interest. We would not like to see a 
doctor who receives commissions from a chemist. Similarly, we would not like to see an 
advisor or a financial analyst who receives commissions from a mutual fund.  
 
Professional finance practitioners, and their education  
There is evidence to show that managers in banks and those in non-bank finance 
companies are themselves not fully rational. This can be taken to mean that the idea of 
complete delegation by households to finance managers is somewhat misplaced. This 
argument is not quite correct for two reasons. First, the question is not whether finance 
managers are completely rational. Instead, the question is whether or not they are 
relatively far more rational than ordinary households. If they are, then there is a case for 
delegation. Second, we may broadly classify risk into two categories – fundamental risk 
and noise trader risk. It is possible that finance managers make relatively more mistakes 
in taking care of noise trader risk than in case of fundamental risk. In such a scenario, 
finance managers are themselves somewhat contributing to noise trader risk by their 
decisions. However, to the extent that noise trader risk originates from participation by 
agents other than finance managers, and to the extent that the noise trader risk is 
primarily due to participation by ordinary investors rather than by finance managers, then 
licensing requirement is useful. It will reduce participation by noise traders, there will be 
less noise trader risk, finance managers will make few errors, and there will be 
improvement in the performance of finance managers. But what if finance managers have 
difficulties in tackling even fundamental risk?    
 
It is proposed here that financial decision making can be done by ordinary households but 
only in consultation with finance managers. It is true that finance managers themselves 
may not be fully informed. In the context of India, this is true to a large extent. However, 
the reason lies less in incompetence than in lack of proper education in general and that in 
financial economics in particular. Financial economics is hardly taught at the 
undergraduate level in India in degree courses that deal with 
economics/commerce/management. At the post graduate level, the conditions are better 
but there is considerable heterogeneity. There have been changes in the recent past but 
we still need to go a long way in meaningfully including financial economics as a subject 
in economics/commerce/management degree courses. For a long time, chartered 
accountants have been employed in finance jobs in India at senior levels, as if there is no 
difference between accountancy and finance! It may not have mattered if the training of 
chartered accountants included a good amount of financial economics but this was not the 
case for long. So as far as Indian experience goes, the performance of finance managers 
is affected not only by their competence but also by their education. So it is important to 
look at some seemingly unrelated issues like education in universities (and possibly even 
in schools) in the context of regulation of the financial sector.     20 
 
It is true that the problem of inadequate exposure to financial economics is somewhat 
peculiar to India (and possibly other developing countries) and cannot be taken to be a 
general problem in the world economy at large. Developed countries do not face this 
problem. Financial economics is routinely taught there. However, they face another 
problem. Most of what is taught in financial economics in the developed countries is of 
the ‘traditional’ variety. It is based on the assumption of rationality. Whether we take 
standard undergraduate textbooks or postgraduate books, financial economics that is 
based on rationality dominates. We may even say that it rules. It is true that in the last 
twenty years or so, there have been significant advances in the field of behavioural 
finance. This is reflected in academic journals (and even in academic conferences). 
However, this is confined to research and has still not trickled down to college education. 
It is the latter which is relevant for most practitioners. And we need to go a long way in 
imparting a more meaningful education in financial economics in developed countries. 
 
Watertight division between behavioural finance and ‘other finance’ 
Even amongst academics, behavioural finance has come up as a separate subject within 
financial economics, rather than as something that is integrated with the more mainstream 
literature. Though there are academics who work in both fields (behavioural finance and 
‘mainstream finance’), we still have predominantly a somewhat watertight division 
between behavioural finance and, what we may call, non-behavioural finance. So even at 
the level of academics and research, behavioural finance has not been integrated with 
non-behavioural finance (Shiller, 2003). This may have contributed to the lack of a 
trickle down of research work to college education. Though there are still debatable 
issues in the new field of behavioural finance, the latter has made a dent and made itself 
useful in explaining behavior of traders and investors, and in explaining the working of 
financial markets. But most practitioners rely on the education they received in college, 
which is primarily of the ‘traditional’ variety. So though in the developed countries, 
financial economics is commonly taught, there are limitations of this knowledge in 
understanding financial markets (and financial crisis).  
 
The place of mainstream financial economics  
In view of the financial crisis and recession at present, the mainstream financial 
economics stands somewhat discredited in the eyes of the ‘informed’ public, the press, 
many policy makers, students, economists who do not specialize in finance, and finally 
many financial economists themselves. It is unfortunate that one event such as the recent 
financial crisis (or a few events) can have so much effect on perception of many people 
regarding the accomplishments in a discipline. After all, there is considerable 
accumulated work of very high standards. And yet, there is perhaps a good reason why 
there is loss of confidence in financial economics as a subject. After all, there have been 
difficulties in prevention of and mitigation against the financial crisis in the recent past.  
 
One key assumption in mainstream financial economics is that agents are rational. In 
other words, the assumption is that noise traders are absent, and hence, noise trader risk is 
absent. Note that many standard textbooks in financial economics still do not include 
noise trader risk in their long list of various types of risks. In this section, we have made a   21 
case for a licensing requirement that attempts to reduce participation by noise traders in 
the financial sector, and, more generally, in the economy as a whole. The less the 
participation by noise traders, the less is the noise trader risk. In the extreme case where 
noise trader risk is completely absent, we are possibly in a world in which mainstream 
financial economics is applicable.  
 
Given the present financial system which includes noise traders, there is, indeed, some 
reason to be skeptical about the teachings of standard financial economics. The way out 
is not to discard the mainstream subject. Instead, there is a need to reduce participation by 
noise traders. Thereafter, we can more comfortably derive our lessons from the 
mainstream finance books.   
 
 
IV Concluding Remarks 
 
It is difficult to achieve perfect regulation of the financial sector. Some errors are 
inevitable for various practical reasons. That is not the worrisome part. However, often 
dogmatic positions take over. Some tend to favour controls and regulations, while many 
others tend to emphasise liberalization only. We have seen in this article how we can 
have both lacunae in financial regulations alongside financial repression. It is under-
regulation that has drawn the attention of politicians and the media in the midst of the 
recent financial crisis and recession. However, there are also cases of over-regulation. 
India has experienced this for a long time. Furthermore, not all areas of under-regulation 
have received attention in this financial crisis. Some important areas of under-regulation, 
as far as this author is aware, have been left untouched.  
 
A quick overview of over-regulation, or financial repression, in India is as follows. Given 
that LLR, deposit insurance, capital adequacy and supervision of banks are in place 
already, there is hardly any need to impose further restrictions like the CRR and SLR for 
the purpose of prudential regulation. It is also important to ensure that banks do not face 
restrictions or hurdles in recovery of their loans. Barriers to entry into banking can be 
relaxed considerably. Some of these changes can have implications for the government’s 
finances in India. So removal of over-regulation of banks will need to go along with 
reforms in the government’s budgetary position.     
 
A quick overview of under-regulation is as follows. At present, operating in financial 
markets is open to just about anybody with funds. We have proposed that it is made 
mandatory that people consult certified financial analysts before any financial decisions 
can be executed. This may seem radical. However, there are several parallels already in 
place. By law, people cannot buy medicines on their own even if they have funds and feel 
sick. They are required to consult doctors. It is mandatory to have a prescription. There 
are restrictions on entry into the medical profession. Similarly, we need restrictions on 
entry into the finance profession. The point of these barriers is not to let only a few enter. 
That will be elitist. Instead, the point is to let only the qualified enter, no matter how 
many they are.    
   22 
Under-regulation of financial markets can make an economy vulnerable to a socially 
costly financial crisis. On the other hand, over-regulation, or financial repression, in the 
banking sector creates distortions in an economy, adversely affects allocative efficiency, 
and decreases the output level in the economy. So, just as there is a rationale for 
removing the lacunae in financial regulations, there is also a case for removal of financial 
repression. Of course, we need to take care that, in the process of restructuring, we do not 
take a narrow view and confine reforms to the financial sector alone. A lot of other 
considerations need to be kept in mind in the process (e.g. the state of teaching and 
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